Explaining rapid reinfections in multiple-wave influenza outbreaks: Tristan da Cunha 1971 epidemic as a case study. by Camacho, A et al.
doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.0300
, 3635-3643 first published online 27 April 2011278 2011 Proc. R. Soc. B
 
Bernard Cazelles
Anton Camacho, Sébastien Ballesteros, Andrea L. Graham, Fabrice Carrat, Oliver Ratmann and
 
outbreaks: Tristan da Cunha 1971 epidemic as a case study
Explaining rapid reinfections in multiple-wave influenza
 
 
Supplementary data
tml 
http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/suppl/2011/04/26/rspb.2011.0300.DC1.h
 "Data Supplement"
References http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/278/1725/3635.full.html#ref-list-1
 This article cites 36 articles, 13 of which can be accessed free
This article is free to access
Subject collections
 (145 articles)health and disease and epidemiology   
 
Articles on similar topics can be found in the following collections
Email alerting service
 hereright-hand corner of the article or click 
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article - sign up in the box at the top
 http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/subscriptions go to: Proc. R. Soc. BTo subscribe to 
 on January 16, 2012rspb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from 
Proc. R. Soc. B (2011) 278, 3635–3643
 on January 16, 2012rspb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from * Autho
Electron
10.1098
doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.0300
Published online 27 April 2011
Received
AcceptedExplaining rapid reinfections in multiple-
wave influenza outbreaks: Tristan da Cunha
1971 epidemic as a case study
Anton Camacho1,*, Se´bastien Ballesteros1,2, Andrea L. Graham3,
Fabrice Carrat4,5,6, Oliver Ratmann7,8 and Bernard Cazelles1,9
1Laboratoire Eco-Evolution Mathe´matique, UMR 7625, CNRS-UPMC-ENS-AgroParisTech,
75230 Paris Cedex 05, France
2Universidade de Lisboa, Centro de Matema´tica e Aplicac¸o˜es Fundamentais, 1649-003 Lisboa, Portugal
3Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-2016, USA
4UPMC—Paris 6, and 5Inserm, UMR-S 707, Paris 75012, France
6Assistance Publique Hoˆpitaux de Paris, Hoˆpital Saint Antoine, Paris 75012, France
7Biology Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
8Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London, Norfolk Place, London W2 1PG, UK
9UMMISCO UMI 209 IRD—UPMC, 93142 Bondy, France
Influenza usually spreads through the human population in multiple-wave outbreaks. Successive reinfec-
tion of individuals over a short time interval has been explicitly reported during past pandemics. However,
the causes of rapid reinfection and the role of reinfection in driving multiple-wave outbreaks remain
poorly understood. To investigate these issues, we focus on a two-wave influenza A/H3N2 epidemic
that occurred on the remote island of Tristan da Cunha in 1971. Over 59 days, 273 (96%) of 284
islanders experienced at least one attack and 92 (32%) experienced two attacks. We formulate six math-
ematical models invoking a variety of antigenic and immunological reinfection mechanisms. Using a
maximum-likelihood analysis to confront model predictions with the reported incidence time series, we
demonstrate that only two mechanisms can be retained: some hosts with either a delayed or deficient
humoral immune response to the primary influenza infection were reinfected by the same strain, thus
initiating the second epidemic wave. Both mechanisms are supported by previous empirical studies
and may arise from a combination of genetic and ecological causes. We advocate that a better understand-
ing and account of heterogeneity in the human immune response are essential to analysis of multiple-wave
influenza outbreaks and pandemic planning.
Keywords: influenza pandemic; reinfection; host immune response; state-space models; model selection1. INTRODUCTION
A swine-origin influenza A/H1N1 virus that arose in 2009
reminds us of the persistent risk of influenza pandemics.
Lessons from the past are precious and may help us to
anticipate and manage such potential disasters [1]. The
most striking example is certainly the ‘Spanish’ influenza
pandemic of 1918–1919 that occurred in three waves and
caused about 50 million deaths worldwide in only nine
months [2]. To date, this multiple-wave outbreak pattern,
which has also been reported during several other pan-
demic episodes, remains only partially understood. On
one hand, there is evidence from the 2009 A/H1N1 pan-
demic that climate variations and school closing and
reopening shape the timing of successive epidemic
waves [3]. On the other hand, the explicit reports of
individuals experiencing reinfections over a short time
interval during pandemic seasons are still poorly
understood [4–7].r for correspondence (camacho@biologie.ens.fr).
ic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/
/rspb.2011.0300 or via http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org.
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4 April 2011 3635A commonly invoked hypothesis is that antigenically
distinct, co-circulating influenza strains that confer only
partial, humoral cross-immunity are each driving separate
influenza outbreaks. Based on this assumption, Barry
et al. [6] estimated the level of cross-protection between
the first and the second waves of the 1918 H1N1 pan-
demic in US Army Camps and Britain, and Rios-Doria
& Chowell [8] fitted a two-strain mathematical model to
the 1918 H1N1 epidemic in Geneva. However, it is also
commonly believed that evolving influenza strains may
take years to escape population immunity, while the
observed inter-wave periods are typically of the order of a
few weeks [2]. Unfortunately, virus or serum samples
from separate waves of past pandemics are too scarce to
resolve this issue on empirical grounds.
Recent findings provide new evidence that supports
the role of alternative reinfection mechanisms in driving
multiple-wave influenza outbreaks. Notably, a large sero-
logical survey conducted during the first wave of the 2009
H1N1 pandemic highlighted host heterogeneity in the
efficient development of humoral immunity [9]. This
report challenges the assumption that influenza infection
confers life-long protection against reinfection by the
same strain [10]. From a theoretical perspective, it isThis journal is q 2011 The Royal Society
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Figure 1. Historical and geographical data. (a) Daily incidence time series as it was originally reported by Mantle & Tyrrell
[13]. (b) Photo and (inset) geographical position of the island of Tristan da Cunha in the South Atlantic Ocean. The Settlement
of Edinburgh of the Seven Seas has been enlarged. Photographs from HMS Endurance’s Helicopter taken on 12 April 2007.
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can be reinfected by the same strain to multiple-wave out-
breaks [11,12]. However, these existing models are rather
phenomenological and have been endowed with different
biological interpretations, ranging from immune escape
by antigenic drift to reinfection by immune deficiency
[11,12].
What is lacking to direct further research is an evi-
dence-based comparison of alternative immunological
hypotheses that attempts to explain multiple-wave influ-
enza outbreaks. We formulate six mechanistic stochastic
models that incorporate a variety of potential antigenic
and immunological mechanisms (i.e. positing both viral
and host heterogeneity) that may explain rapidly occur-
ring reinfection waves during influenza outbreaks.
Particular emphasis is given to ensure that each hypoth-
esis is associated with exactly one, parsimonious model.
Using a simulation-based maximum-likelihood (ML)
analysis, we interface these models with case data from
the two-wave influenza epidemic that was reported on
the remote island of Tristan da Cunha (TdC) in 1971
[13] (figure 1).
Historical circumstances make this case a unique natu-
ral experiment well-suited to mathematical modelling and
statistical inference for multiple reasons: (i) moderate size
and free social mixing of the community under study,
(ii) full isolation of the community throughout the epi-
demic rules out the hypothesis that a second influenza
virus was introduced from outside, (iii) incidents of influ-
enza in the community were remarkably low and uniform
before the 1971 epidemic, and (iv) the daily reported
incidence counts are almost exhaustive [13] (§2a).
Our study reveals that, when demographic stochasti-
city is appropriately accounted for, the second epidemic
wave can only be explained with mechanisms attributable
to delayed or deficient humoral immune responses. Our
strictly mechanistic interpretations enable us to quantitat-
ively compare our results with empirical data and we closeProc. R. Soc. B (2011)with an evaluation of the potential genetic and ecological
determinants of variation in host susceptibility.2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Data
TdC is a volcanic island in the South Atlantic Ocean. It has
been inhabited since the nineteenth century and in 1971, the
284 islanders were living in the single village of the island:
Edinburgh of the Seven Seas (figure 1b). Whereas the
internal contacts were typical of close-knit village commu-
nities, contacts with the outside world were infrequent and
mostly owing to fishing vessels that occasionally took passen-
gers to or from the island. These ships were often the cause of
introduction of new diseases into the population [14]. Focus-
ing on influenza, several serological analyses between 1955
and 1963 provide important insights into the immune
status of the adults among the 284 islanders present in
1971. Following an epidemic of A/H1N1 in 1954 during
which most of the islanders were infected, antibodies to
older influenza A and B types were detected in islanders
over 20 years of age [15]. In 1961, when the volcano erupted,
the island was evacuated to Britain and the islanders were
given a polyvalent influenza vaccine that contained an
A/H2N2 strain and a recent B strain. Serological studies
showed a good response to this inoculation [16]. After the
population returned to TdC in 1963, no influenza epidemic
had been reported. In this context of a small population with
a small and homogeneous immune repertoire against influ-
enza virus, an unusual epidemic occurred in 1971, 3 years
after the global emergence of the new subtype A/H3N2.
On August 13, a ship returning from Cape Town landed
five islanders on TdC. Three of them developed acute respir-
atory disease during the 8 day voyage and the other two
presented similar symptoms immediately after landing.
Various family gatherings welcomed their disembarkation
and in the ensuing days, an epidemic started to spread
rapidly throughout the whole island population. After three
Explaining rapid influenza reinfections A. Camacho et al. 3637
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some islanders developed second attacks and a second peak
of cases was recorded. The epidemic faded out after this
second wave and lasted a total of 59 days (figure 1a).
Among the 284 islanders, 273 (96%) experienced at least
one attack and 92 (32%, mainly adults) experienced two
attacks. Only a few individuals experienced their single
attack during the second epidemic wave. Unfortunately,
only 312 of the 365 attacks (85%) are known to within a
single day of accuracy and constitute the dataset [13]. A pre-
cise description of the clinical features of the illness as well as a
review of the secondary infections were provided by Mantle &
Tyrrell [13]. The authors reported that 85 per cent of the first
attacks were moderate or severe, and this proportion decreased
to 50 per cent for the second attacks. Serological analyses of 11
infected individuals demonstrated a high level of antibody
against A/H3N2, a subtype to which the population had
never previously been exposed. Moreover, seroconversion of
individuals infected for the first time during either the first or
the second epidemic wave attests that the virus was circulating
throughout the epidemic. Unfortunately, no virological analysis
was conducted to show whether first and second attacks were
due to antigenically differing strains of A/H3N2.(b) Mechanistic modelling of reinfection hypotheses
In their original paper from 1973, Mantle & Tyrrell [13]
proposed that this two-wave epidemic could have been
caused by either the initial introduction of two separate
viral agents or reinfection by the same viral agent. Although
this second hypothesis appeared to them as the only possi-
bility, they were unable to determine whether antigenic
changes in the virus had occurred, allowing for second infec-
tion, or whether some patients did not acquire an efficient
immune protection and either suffered a recrudescence of
infection or were reinfected by other patients. We expand
upon these possibilities as follows:
— Although originally dismissed [13], the first biological
hypothesis (subsequently referred as the 2 Virus, or 2Vi,
hypothesis) assumes that two separate viral agents,
with different transmissibility, were introduced at the
beginning of the epidemic.
— The Mutation (Mut) hypothesis assumes that a single
initiating virus mutated within an infected host during
the first epidemic wave, leading to the emergence of a
new antigenic variant [8].
— The All-or-Nothing (AoN) hypothesis assumes that fol-
lowing recovery from infection, some hosts did not
develop a long-term protective immunity and remained
fully susceptible to reinfection by the same strain [9,11].
— The Partially Protective Immunity (PPI) hypothesis
assumes that following recovery from infection, all hosts
developed a long-term immunity that is not fully protective
but reduces the risk of reinfection by the same strain [12].
— The In-Host (InH) hypothesis assumes that following infec-
tion some hosts were unable to completely eliminate the
viral load and suffered from an intra-host recrudescence
of infection [13].
— The Window-of-reinfection (Win) hypothesis assumes
that following recovery, long-term protective immunity
can take some time before becoming effective [9], result-
ing in a time window of susceptibility to reinfection by the
same strain.Proc. R. Soc. B (2011)An extensively used epidemiological model for influenza
dynamics is of susceptible–exposed–infectious–removed
(SEIR) form [8,11]. After exposure to the virus, suscep-
tible hosts (S) pass through an exposed state (E) of
latent infection, become infective (I) and are finally
removed (R) from the infectious pool as they simul-
taneously recover and acquire permanent immunity.
However, our immunological hypotheses motivate a more
accurate description of the different stages from infection
to development of long-term protective immunity. We
incorporate several known [8,11,12,17,18] and novel fea-
tures to the classical SEIR model in order to
mechanistically translate the six biological hypotheses into
six stochastic state-space models (see figure 2 and elec-
tronic supplementary material, text S1, for further
details). Particular emphasis is given to ensure that each
model combines enough parsimony to enable parameter
inference and enough complexity to match unambiguously
to a single hypothesis.(c) Simulation and model selection
Given the small population of TdC, demographic stochasti-
city is expected to play a significant role in the epidemic
dynamics, especially during the inter-wave period when the
number of infected hosts is low and epidemic fade-out is
likely to happen. We therefore used the stochastic framework
of continuous-time Markov chains that naturally allows
demographic stochasticity to be taken into account. The
Markov chain events and the transition rates used to simulate
the six models are provided in electronic supplementary
material, text S1.5. Numerical simulations were performed
using the exact algorithm provided by Gillespie [19].
Model-predicted incidence is computed by counting the
daily number of new hosts entering the infectious class I.
Since the dataset reports only 85 per cent of the total
number of attacks and in order to take account of possible
unreported asymptomatic cases, the observation process
must also be modelled. More precisely, after having checked
that the data were not overdispersed (electronic supplemen-
tary material, text S1.6), we assumed a Poisson process
observation whose reporting rate parameter (r) was also
inferred [20].
Our approach for evaluating the reinfection hypotheses
rests on a statistical comparison of the corresponding state-
space models to the shape and the dynamics of the observed
daily incidence counts while, crucially, allowing for demo-
graphic stochasticity. For a time series y1:T of T successive
observations and a state-space model Hi with parameter
vector u, the likelihood is given by L(ujHi) ¼ P( y1:T j u, Hi).
Parameter inference and model selection are based on an iter-
ated filtering procedure that converges to the ML parameter
estimate (uML) for each model to the incidence data [20].
We performed log-likelihood profiles in order to check conver-
gence to the ML and to calculate 95% confidence intervals for
parameter estimates. Finally, we used the corrected Akaike
information criterion (AICc) to select the model that best
explains the data: AICc
i ¼ 22l(uMLjHi)þ 2k þ 2k(k þ 1)/
(T2 k2 1), where k is the number of estimated parameters
plus initial conditions, T ¼ 59 is the number of observations
and l(uMLjHi)¼ log L(uMLjHi) is the maximized log likelihood.
This correction accounts for the small sample size relative to
the number of parameters (T/k, 10). Finally, we decomposed
the maximized log likelihood of each model into conditional log
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2. The six models with six different reinfection mechanisms can be retrieved by adding to three common skeletons (in
black) the transitions corresponding to the indicated colour. All models have five epidemiological states in common: susceptible
(S), exposed (E), clinically ill and infectious (I), temporarily removed from the transmission process (R) and protected in the
long-term against reinfection by the same strain (L). To improve biological realism, durations of the states E, I and R are all
gamma-distributed (electronic supplementary material, text S1.1). (a) The 2Vi (blue) and Mut (red) models implement a
widely used history-based formalism [17,18] with (i, j) e f1,2g2 and i= j. Upper index stands for the infective strain,
bottom index for the already-immunized strain, li ¼ bi(I i þ Iji )/N is the force of infection of strain i and both strains are sup-
posed to have the same mean latent, infective and temporary removed periods (electronic supplementary material, text S1.2).
Hosts recovered from strain i enter the Li class and become completely protected against reinfection by strain i while remaining
susceptible to the other circulating strain j. For the Mut model, the two strains are supposed to have the same transmissibility
(b1 ¼ b2, see electronic supplementary material, text S1.2) and to interact through a cross-immunity parameter s e [0,1] that acts
by reducing the susceptibility to the other strain (electronic supplementary material, text S1.3). The dashed red arrow indicates
that at time Tmut if I
1. 0, one infectious host with the initial strain (i¼ 1) becomes infectious with the mutated strain ( j ¼ 2).
(b,c) For the AoN, PPI, InH and Win models, l ¼ bI/N is the force of infection of the single strain. In the AoN model (red),
we assume that hosts acquire full protection against reinfection with probability a, otherwise they re-enter the S class. In the
PPI model (blue), we assume that all hosts develop long-term immunity that partially reduces the level of susceptibility through
a protection factor s e [0,1]. In the InH model (green), we assume that infected hosts are able to clear the viral load with prob-
ability a, otherwise they suffer from an intra-host reinfection and, after some time, re-enter the I state. In the Win model (c), we
assume host heterogeneity in the waiting time for acquisition of a completely protective immunity [9]: if some hosts re-enter the
transmission process before protection is effective, they fall into a time window of susceptibility to reinfection (W ). We simply
assume that all hosts remain in the W state for a duration that is exponentially distributed: this distribution has a positive density
in zero, thus enabling some hosts to immediately enter the L class (electronic supplementary material, text S1.4). Parameter
descriptions can be found in figure 3. The transition rates to simulate the six stochastic models are provided in electronic
supplementary material, text S1.5.
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models at successive observation times t (see electronic
supplementary material, text S2, for further details on the
inference framework).3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Model selection
The maximized likelihood provides a first quantitative
answer to the objective question: ‘How likely is it that
the stochastic process resulted in the observed epidemic?’.
The AICc [21] is then a related measure of the expected
predictive capability of the model that penalizes model
complexity. The rescaled AICc values, presented in
figure 3, allow for an immediate ranking of the competing
models and show that the Win mechanism best explains the
data. Following the rough rule of thumb of Burnham &Proc. R. Soc. B (2011)Anderson [22], the AoN hypothesis also receives substan-
tial support (DAICc  2). In contrast, the 2Vi and Mut
models have considerably less support (DAICc. 7),
whereas the InH and PPI models have essentially no sup-
port (DAICc p 10). This rule of thumb has proved to be
efficient in many practical situations [22,23] and can
formally be justified by computing the evidence ratio of
each competing model (electronic supplementary material,
text S3). However, it has also been shown that one should
be cautious regarding the systematic use of this rule
of thumb when applying AIC corrections [23], which
motivates a more detailed analysis of DAICc values.
First, we identified that the differences in the log likeli-
hoods (and thus AICc) accumulate during the inter-wave
period, the second epidemic wave and the extinction
period after the second wave (figure 4a–e, lower panels).
Second, to investigate whether the differences in
model
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Figure 3. Maximum-likelihood estimates (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (vertical lines) for model parameters (see elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S2, for computational details). Numerical values are provided in electronic supplementary
material, table S11, and we refer to electronic supplementary material, table S12, for initial conditions. The two different values
of R0 for the 2Vi model correspond to the low and high transmissible viruses.
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ences in reproducing the characteristic second wave, we
performed predictive checks by simulating 105 time
series under each ML-fitted model. Comparison of the be-
haviour of the best model (Win) with each competitor
reveals superimposed dynamics with the AoN model and
confirms that the dynamics of the four other models are
different with respect to the second epidemic wave
(figure 4a–e, upper panels). Furthermore, figure 4f
shows that the extinction probability increases rapidly at
the end of the first wave for the 2Vi, Mut and PPI
models, whereas the Win and AoN models appear to be
much more robust to stochastic extinctions during the
inter-wave period. In the electronic supplementary
material, text S4, we supplement a suite of statistical ana-
lyses to evaluate and compare the goodness of fit of these
predictive simulations to the characteristic second-wave
infection dynamics. Overall, these analyses support the
view that, out of the models considered, the Win and
AoN models explain the observed time series significantly
better.
Our predictive simulations emphasize the paramount
role of demographic stochasticity in the multiple-wave
infection dynamics on this small island. In particular,
given the elevated risk of epidemic fade-out during the
low-prevalence inter-wave period, we find that only a sto-
chastic framework can accurately assess alternative
reinfection hypotheses.
Regarding the 2Vi hypothesis, R0 estimates (figure 3)
indicate that the two viruses should have had very differ-
ent transmissibility (both viruses are supposed to have the
same duration of infection). The resulting dynamics
reveal that during the first epidemic wave, the highly
transmissible virus outcompetes the poorly transmissible
virus, which has a 35 per cent risk of extinction owing
to ecological interference (electronic supplementary
material, text S5). However, if the poorly transmissible
virus manages to maintain a low prevalence until the
end of the first wave, when the highly transmissible
virus goes extinct, then it can initiate the second epidemic
wave (electronic supplementary material, figure S8).Proc. R. Soc. B (2011)On the other hand, the newly emerging variant in the
Mut hypothesis has a 60 per cent chance of early extinc-
tion [24] because it has a low effective reproduction
number Re  1.7 (electronic supplementary material,
text S5) and only one host initially infected. This latter
choice can be justified a posteriori: the ML estimated
level of antigenic escape is high (sML  20% ) and similar
to that of antigenic cluster transitions occurring each 2–8
years at the scale of the global human population [25,26].
However, we demonstrate in electronic supplementary
material, text S6, that the AIC, the sML and the risk of
extinction are only weakly sensitive to the relaxation of
this assumption.
The case of the PPI hypothesis is more complicated.
A previous analysis of a similar but deterministic model
[12] has revealed that dynamics depend on a reinfection
parameter sR0. When this parameter is well above a rein-
fection threshold (sR0. 1), reinfection becomes self-
sustained and dynamics are SIS-like, whereas below this
threshold primary infection dominates and leads to SIR-
like dynamics. Our stochastic PPI model estimates
sR0 ¼ 1.18 and indicates critical dynamics: the reinfec-
tion parameter must be sufficiently high to reduce
stochastic extinctions during the inter-wave period, but
at the same time it must be sufficiently low to avoid sus-
tained reinfection and therefore more than two epidemic
waves. Put another way, epidemic fade-out after the
second wave can only be reproduced near the reinfection
threshold (sR0p1), which simultaneously generates a
significant inter-wave extinction probability.
The case of the InH hypothesis might seem surprising
as its extinction probability remains null all along the epi-
demic. This result is in fact straightforward since
reinfection in this model does not depend on a contact
process and is not subject to demographic stochasticity.
This reinfection mechanism is therefore very robust to
the small population size but interestingly it is not sup-
ported by the statistical comparisons. This emphasizes
the sensitivity and accuracy of our ML approach regard-
ing the shape and the dynamics of the incidence time
series (figure 4d).
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Figure 4. (a–e, upper panels) Qualitative comparison of the dynamics of each competing model (in blue: (a) AoN; (b) 2Vi;
(c) Mut; (d) InH; (e) PPI) to the best model (Win, in red) and to the daily number of new cases reported in the data
(black dots). For each model and associated ML parameter set, the mean predicted incidence (solid line) and corresponding
95% confidence envelope owing to demographic stochasticity and observation error (shaded area) were computed over 105
stochastic simulations by conditioning on occurrence of the second epidemic wave (electronic supplementary material,
text S4). Note that the dynamics of the Win and AoN models are superimposed (a). For the Mut model (c), emergence
time of the second variant (Tmut) is indicated on the x-axis. (a–e, lower panels) Quantitative comparison of the conditional
log likelihoods for each observation time t: CLLt ¼ log(P(ytjy1:t21, uML, Hi ), where y1:T is the daily incidence dataset and
uML is the ML parameter set of a given model Hi. Absolute differences (jDCCLtj, blue and red bars, left axis) allow quantitative
identification of the parts of the time series where the Win model is better than the competing model Hi (Win. Hi). Similarly,
evolution of the absolute cumulative differences (jPi¼1t DCCLij, black line, right axis) indicates that the Win model performs
always better than the competing model, at least after the second epidemic wave has begun. ( f ) Evolution of the extinction
probability for each model defined at each point of time as the proportion of faded-out trajectories (E(t) ¼ I(t) ¼ 0) over
105 stochastic realizations. ( f ) Blue line with circles, Mut; blue line with squares, 2Vi; blue line with diamonds, PPI; solid
red line, Win; solid blue line, AoN; blue line with triangles, InH.
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form almost equally well despite being based on
antagonistic mechanisms. Indeed, the Win hypothesis
assumes that 100 per cent of the infected hosts can be
reinfected during a limited period lasting an average of
4.8 days, whereas the AoN hypothesis assumes that only
47 per cent of the infected hosts can be reinfected at
any time. This superimposed dynamics is in fact specific
to the epidemiological context of TdC and we show in
electronic supplementary material, text S7, that theProc. R. Soc. B (2011)dynamics of these two models would differ both qualitat-
ively and quantitatively in the epidemiological context of a
large population.
(b) Parameter estimates
ML estimates and 95% confidence intervals for model
parameters are shown in figure 3. The first observation
concerns the high values of the basic reproduction
number (R0) and its large variation from one model to
another. R0 estimates are similar for the Mut, AoN and
Explaining rapid influenza reinfections A. Camacho et al. 3641
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model, but more than twice as high for the InH model
owing to an identifiability issue (electronic supplementary
material, text S8). Overall, these high values for R0 are
somewhat unusual: R0 is typically estimated around 2
for influenza, although exceptional cases have also been
reported in closed populations [27]. We contend that a
high value of R0 as well as rapid spread (the first peak
was reached after only 6 days) and a high attack rate
(96%) can be expected in small, isolated communities
[28] without pre-existing immunity [29]. Furthermore,
estimates of the effective reproductive number from the
TdC incidence time series [30] are in agreement with
our estimates of R0 (electronic supplementary material,
text S9).
The generation time (average time between primary and
secondary cases) can be estimated by the sum of the mean
latent period plus half the mean duration of infectiousness
[31]. ML estimates under the two best models are 3.2 days
(Win) and 3.3 days (AoN) and in agreement with those
previously published for A/H3N2 [32].
Recently, Mathews et al. [11] fitted a deterministic
model (similar to the AoN model) on the same dataset.
Their parameter estimates were very close to our values
except for R0 (6.44 versus 11.27) and for the mean
latent (1.36 versus 2.07 days) and infective (0.98 versus
2.44 days) periods. We suggest that this discrepancy is
mainly attributable to the incorporation of demographic
stochasticity in our approach. Indeed, deterministic
models neglect the probability of stochastic extinction
and should implicitly underestimate the above parameters
that play a significant role during the inter-wave period
(electronic supplementary material, figure S9).
The estimate of the proportion of the total cases that
were reported in the data, r, is  70 per cent under all
models. As expected, this value is under the empirical
threshold of 85 per cent owing to data uncertainties
(§2a) and the remaining discrepancy can easily be
explained by undetected asymptomatic cases [11,32].
Variation of the mean temporary removed period from
one model to another is expected since interpretation of
the R state depends on the reinfection mechanism con-
sidered (electronic supplementary material, text S1.1).
In particular, ML estimates under the two best models
are 13.61 days (Win) and 11.57 days (AoN) and in agree-
ment with the duration of the short-term, cell-mediated
protection, as we now discuss.(c) Immunological support for reinfection
Our results suggest that heterogeneity among hosts (e.g.
in the timely development of protective immunity) is a
significantly more likely explanation for 1971’s two-wave
influenza outbreak on TdC than viral heterogeneity (e.g.
in antigenic type). This suggestion finds empirical sup-
port in known mechanisms of immunity to influenza.
In particular, both the Win and AoN mechanisms
might be explained in light of genetic and/or ecological
determinants of susceptibility.
A multi-pronged innate [33] and adaptive [34]
immune response is optimal for clearing influenza infec-
tion. The innate response is the first to be activated and
plays a key role through its ability to control early viral
replication and to promote and regulate the virus-specificProc. R. Soc. B (2011)adaptive immune response [33]. Cytokines are among the
most important bridges between the innate and adaptive
responses to influenza [35]. The adaptive response itself
may be broken into two critical sub-components: (i) the
cellular immune response by which antigen-specific cyto-
toxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) eliminate infected cells and
thus prevent viral release, and (ii) the humoral immune
response by which serum antibodies efficiently neutralize
the virus (both of which are promoted by T-cell help [34]).
Antibodies can remain detectable for years after infection
and prevent reinfection by the same strain as well as by suffi-
ciently cross-reactive variants [36]. Genetic variation in any
of these immune components might determine whether or
how rapidly an individual develops protective immunity
following primary influenza infection (in keeping with the
AoN or Win hypotheses, respectively).
It is important to note that during primary influenza
infection, the innate and cellular responses play the key
role in viral clearance whereas neutralizing antibodies are
generated later and do not play a significant role unless the
viral load is high/sustained [37]. The primary CTL response
is detectable in blood after 6–14 days whereas the neutraliz-
ing antibody response peaks at four to six weeks [38].
Critically, the CTL response is downregulated after viral
clearance [37], disappears by day 21 post-infection [38]
and is followed by a state of immunological ‘memory’ with
antigen-specific T cells. The memory cells cannot prevent
reinfection as well as specific antibodies could, but they
can reduce the severity of the disease [37]. Together, these
elements support the Win hypothesis: our parameter esti-
mates indicate that the reinfection window occurred 17.8
days (s.d. 6.4 days) post-infection and lasted for 4.8 days
(s.d. 4.8 days). This timing of susceptibility is in good agree-
ment with the interval between the completion of CTL
contraction and the full development of the neutralizing anti-
body response.Moreover, the reduced severity of most of the
reinfection episodes in TdC (§2) might be explained by the
T-cell ‘memory’.
In agreement with the AoN hypothesis, it has been
reported that a protective serum antibody response
cannot be detected in approximately 20 per cent of sub-
jects after natural influenza infection [38]. However, our
estimate is much higher and indicates that about 50 per
cent of the islanders did not mount a protective response
following the first infection. It has been proposed that this
lack of protective immunity could be related to a low prior
exposure to influenza [11]. Interestingly, the high level of
consanguinity among the islanders, together with evi-
dence that genetic bottlenecks occurred in the history of
the population [39], may also have led to the over-
representation of an unusual genotype involved in the
control of influenza.
Furthermore, ecological factors including the dose of
virus that initiates infection and the time interval between
primary and secondary exposure may shape Win or AoN
immunity, or indeed may make Win immunity appear as
an AoN phenomenon. For example, the amount of virus
in the lung determines the multiplicity of infection of
innate antigen-presenting cells, which in turn affects
their ability to induce subsequent adaptive responses
[33]. Additionally, the rate at which immunity to reinfec-
tion develops is likely to interact with exposure rates to
determine susceptibility. For example, when force of
infection is high (as on TdC), many hosts are likely to
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bility to reinfection closes. If force of infection is low,
then most hosts will have closed that window before
re-exposure (electronic supplementary material, text S7).(d) Outlook
In this study, we assessed and compared six potential anti-
genic and immunological drivers of multiple-wave influenza
A outbreaks on a two-wave influenza A/H3N2 epidemic
that occurred on the island of TdC in 1971. We transla-
ted these hypotheses unambiguously into six mechanistic
stochastic models, and employed a rigorous statistical frame-
work based on ML [20] for parameter inference and model
selection. In addition, we performed complementary statisti-
cal analyses, based on extensive simulations, to evaluate and
compare the goodness of fit of the predictions of our six
models.Ourfindings emphasize that a stochastic formulation
is essential to capture demographic stochasticity induced by
small populations [24] and/or low-prevalence inter-wave
periods. We show that two mechanisms—both invoking
host heterogeneity rather than viral heterogeneity—are sig-
nificantly better supported by the data. Both mechanisms
challenge the efficiency of the human immune response fol-
lowing primary influenza infection, indicating that, after a
first attack, some individuals with delayed (Win) or deficient
(AoN) humoral immune response could be reinfected by the
same strain.
Further analyses to distinguish between the Win and
AoN mechanisms will require more empirical data on
reinfection at the individual level. Unfortunately, the orig-
inal paper by Mantle & Tyrrell [13] does not provide such
information, but surveillance of more recent influenza
outbreaks may offer suitable data. For example, three
cases of rapid reinfection by the same strain over a short
time scale have been reported during the 2009 H1N1
pandemic [7]. We advocate application of state-of-the-
art virological and immunological methods to samples
from such cases. Alternatively, both parameter estimates
and immunological support for the Win model indicate
that successive infections by the same strain spaced over
more than four to six weeks can only be explained by
the AoN mechanism. We advocate application of our stat-
istical approach to other multiple-wave datasets that
occurred on a longer time scale than that of 1971’s
epidemic on TdC. It is also possible that ongoing
outbreaks may enable tests of our results, and we refer
to electronic supplementary material, text S7, for
qualitative guidelines for such tests.
Finally, our results advocate a better account of host het-
erogeneity in the analysis of multiple-wave outbreaks. In
particular, studies assuming that the immune response
always provides a long-term humoral protection should
overestimate the amount of immune escape required to
sequential influenza variants to cause rapid reinfection [6]
and multiple-wave outbreaks [8]. Put another way, our
results may have important implications in the current con-
text of influenza post-pandemic. Notably, the AoN
mechanism, in addition to antigenic drift and compensatory
mutations, would contribute to break population herd
immunity by increasing the effective reproduction number
of subsequent 2009 H1N1 influenza variants (electronic
supplementary material, text S7). If empirically validated,
these novel interactions should be included inProc. R. Soc. B (2011)epidemiological models aimed at pandemic planning and
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